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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

SHIRLENE RAE TURNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THOMAS DE LAN TURNER,
Defendant and Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17257

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

)

---------------------------------------~----------------------------------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce not involving children, in which
questions of property distribution, alimony and attorney fees are
presented to the

Court for consideration.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial on the issues was had on the 21st day of May, 1980, and
following additional argument and motions, the Court entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on the 3rd
day of July, 1980.

The Decree granted the divorce to the plaintiff,

provided for certain support, division of property and attorney fees.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks amendment of the trial court's determination
as to property distribution, alimony, and attorney fees, and an Order
from the Court remanding the case to the District Court for revision
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with respect to all of such items in conformance with the Order
of the Court, with a requested Order of the Supreme Court directing
that the property acquired by the parties during the marriage be
distributed in approximately one-half value to the plaintiff and
one-half value to the defendant; ordering that the plaintiff be
granted additional amounts for alimony, and for attorney fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For simplicity in reference, the titles "Plaintiff" and
"Defendant" will be used herein.
The plaintiff and the defendant were inter-married at
San Leandro, California on the 26th day of June, 1971.

Each of the

parties had been previously divorced from other spouses.

T. 32-24.

The plaintiff brought into the marriage, household furnishings and
fixtures, and a vehicle acquired from her first marriage; the
defendant lost most of his property to his prior wife,

T. 33-4,

but did have household furnishings and fixtures, some savings,
interest in real estate, interest in hie mother's estate, and work
tools, having a value based upon defendant's testimony, of approximatel1
$23,000.

At the time of their marriage, each of the parties were

employed, with the plaintiff working at the Bank of America, and the
defendant working as an officer for the Oakland City Police Department
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-3Just several weeks prior to their marriage, the parties acquired
a house, and the down payment was made from the defendant's funds.
As the parties entered into the marriage, the plaintiff brought her
minor child, who was approximately 9 years of age at the time.
The defendant did not have children which he brought into the
marriage, and the parties to this action did not have children during
the course of their marriage.
From the time of their marriage, the parties pooled their
mutual assets and also pooled their earnings.

Their mutual goal was

to acquire sufficient cash assets so that they could move to Utah and
acquire farm property and locate themselves here.

T. 49-17.

This

goal was eventually consummated and the parties began to purchase
real estate in Utah in 1974, and continued to purchase several years
thereafter, eventually acquiring in Utah, property generally described
as the Malmgren home, Horton home, Christensen farm, and Bendixen farm.
A complete analysis of the assets acquired by the parties during their
marriage was submitted to the Court, and is found at Page 31 of the
record.

Based upon that analysis, the parties paid for the assets

acquired $111,929.00, and these assets had a net value at the time
of the divorce proceedings of $190,700.00.

T. 8-11.

During the

marriage the parties had acquired from the wages of each, together
with certain pension benefits and sales of property, and loans, total
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-4disposable income in the sum of $290,949.00.

The values for the

property as specified by the plaintiff were determined by consultation
with her attorney and by using the multiple listing catalog provided
by the Real Estate Association serving the Juab County area, where
the parties' property is located.

T. 11-16.

Further, by using

depreciation tax schedules, and based upon joint values and values
placed upon the property by the defendant.

T. 12-12, T. 13-19, T. 14-c'

T. 23-18, T. 51-29.
As the property was acquired it was acquired by the jointly
pooled money of the parties, and the property was placed in their
joint names.

T. 54-25, R. 87.

During the time of their marriage, the defendant continued his
employment at the Oakland City Police Department, even past a retirement:
point, so as to qualify his wife for certain pension benefits.

T. SS·li

However, these pension benefits, in so far as the plaintiff is concernel,
terminated at the divorce, but the defendant continued to receive the
benefits as established by the marriage.

R. 89.

Further, the

pension benefits acquired by the plaintiff through her employment,
were terminated through the property investments by reason of her
withdrawing of those pension funds and withdrawing from her work with
Bank of America.

R. 89.

As the parties acquired their Utah property, they then made plan!
to move to Utah and eventually did so; and with the move from Californi•
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-5to Utah the plaintiff tenninated her employment outside the family
business, and stayed in Utah, worked on the farm, managed the family
home and functioned as the manager of the family business.
T. 64-11.

R. 88,

The defendant, on the other hand, secured employment as an

iron worker with Kennecott Copper, working in the Huntington, Utah
area, and worked as an instructor at Snow College, and at the time of
the divorce was working essentially with the farm.

At the time of

the divorce the plaintiff was employed as a receptionist at a local
medical clinic.
The Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce
from the defendant on grounds of mental cruelty, there being evidence
introduced that there were numerous arguments between the parties;
that the defendant often resorted to threatening divorce action and
that finally he transferred hie affections from the plaintiff to another
woman; that he presented himself in public with a woman other than the
plaintiff, and even went to the Clinic where the plaintiff was employed
in the company of his lady friend, and there secured blood tests for
a marriage contemplated in the future.
to the plaintiff.

And that the same was humiliating

T. 4-27, T. 6-26, T. 8-5.

At the time of the divorce the defendant's income consisted of
cash coming from hie pension with the Oakland City Police Department,
which brought a net income of $923 per month; in addition to that,he
had whatever income he was able to derive from the farm, but the
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defendant refused to testify as to same, but did indicate that his
health was sufficient to allow him to continue his farming operation,
T. 73-21.

T. 74-17.

The plaintiff testified that she was employed

at the medical clinic in Nephi, Utah where her net monthly income was
approximately $540.

The plaintiff testified that her present monthly

expenses were $763, and would shortly increase to approximately $WOO
per month.

T. 26-20, R. 38.

And based upon such analysis, she had an

iunnediate need of $225 per month alimony, and that amount would increas,
in the year of 1981 to approximately $500 per month.

Based upon the

financial analysis of earnings during the marriage, R. 34, the parties
.

I

had in addition to the monies spent for the purchase of their property,!
disposable income of approximately $20,000 per year.

T. 21-16, R. 36.

It was upon this income that the plaintiff's standard of living was
established.
There was undisputed testimony that the reasonable attorney fees
for the efforts of plaintiff's attorney, was the sum of $1500.

T. 87-11,:

and the Court so found, R. 90.
With this factual background, the Court distributed the property
according to the values placed thereon by the plaintiff, so as to give
to the plaintiff a net distribution of $52 ,642 .00, and to the defendant
a net distribution of $146 ,050 .00; or, 27% of the assets to the plaintili
and 73% of the assets to the defendant.

Or on the other hand, based upo:
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-7the values placed upon the property by the defendant, the plaintiff
received a net distribution of $60,274.00, and the defendant received
a net distribution of $115 ,850.00; or, 33% to the plaintiff and
67% to the defendant.
The Court granted the plaintiff alimony in the sum of $50 per
month, for 24 consecutive months.

And the Court granted the plaintiff

judgment against the defendant for reasonable attorney fees in the sum
of $500.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A MARITAL ESTATE SHOULD ·BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WHERE EACH PARTY HAS CONTRIBUTED SIMILAR TIME AND
EFFORT TO THE ACCUMULATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE PROPERTY
WHICH IS ACQUIRED IN THEIR JOINT NAMES.

The authority of a trial court to dispose of property in a
divorce proceeding is specified statutorily in U.C.A. 1953
Section 30-3-5(1):
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may
make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable. The
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to
the support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support and
maintenance, or the distribution of property as
shall be reasonable and necessary . . .
The requirement that court orders concerning property disposition
be equitable was likewise contained in earlier statutes.
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 3000; U.C.A. 1943 Section 40-3-5.
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The Utah Supreme Court has been quite consistent through the
years in its pronouncements concerning property distribution in
divorce cases.

In almost all its opinions discussing the i8sue on

appeal, the Court has variously noted that the trial judge has
considerable latitute of discretion in the matter. Naylor v. Naylor,
563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977).

This means that even though the trial

court's judgment may be reviewed on appeal, it will not be disturbed
"unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding of the
trial court; or there has been a plain abuse of discretion; or where
a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought."

MacDonald v. MacDonald,

120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951).
The Supreme Court has gone further to provide guidelines
regarding the trial court's discretion.

Several opinions focus

generally on the equity that the trial court should seek in its judgm<r:

ri\J

court's duty is . . . to arrange the best possible
allocation of the property and the economic resources of
the parties so that the parties and their children can
pursue their lives in as happy and useful a manner as
possible. If it appears that the decree is so discordant
with an equitable allocation that it will likely lead to
further difficulties and distress than to serve the desired
objective, then a reappraisal of the decree must be undertaken.
(Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979))
The responsibility of the trial court is to endeavor to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic
resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives
on a happy and useful basis. (Grannne v. Grannne, 587 P.2d
144, 148 (Utah 1978), rehearing denied (1979))
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These seem to be statements of the policy seen behind U.C.A.
1953 30-3-5( 1).
Although the Court has dealt often with divorce cases and
property distribution, it has recently reaffirmed that, "in the
distribution of the marital estate, there is no fixed rule or
formula."

Gramme v. Gramme, supra, at 148.

This does not mean

that the trial court's discretion is unlimited, because the Court
has often listed factors a court might consider when they are
pertinent to the case being tried.

The most inclusive listing of

such factors was made by (then) Mr. Justice Crockett in MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). Because most of the
factors suggested in other cases are included in that list, it is
duplicated here for the sake of convenience:
The first six relate to conditions existing at the time of the
marriage.
(1) The social position and standard of living of each before
marriage.
(2)

The respective ages of the parties.

(3)

What each may have given up for the marriage.

(4)

What money or property each brought into the marriage.

(5)

The physical and mental health of the parties.

(6)

The relative ability, training, and education of the parties.
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The rest are conditions to be appraised at the time of the divorce.
(7)

The time of duration of the marriage.

(8) The present income of the parties and the property acquired
during marriage and owned either jointly or by each now.
(9)

How it was acquired and the efforts of each in doing so.

(10) Children reared, their present ages, and obligations to them
or help which may in some instances be expected.
(11)

The present mental and physical health of the parties.

(12)

The present age and life expectancy of the parties.

(13) The happiness and pleasure or lack of it, experienced during
the marriage.
(14) Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care which may have
been given to the spouse or others, such as mother, father, etc.,
and obligations to other dependents having a secondary right to
support.
(15) The present standards of living and needs of each including
the cost of living.
In addition to this list of factors, brief mention should be
made of a "rule of thumb" some courts have occasionally resorted to,
namely that, in dividing the marital estate, one-third thereof
should go to the wife and two-thirds to the husband.

This concept

apparently has its basis in an early Utah Supreme Court opinion that
compares the dissolution of marriage by divorce to dissolution of
marriage by death, in which case the conunon law would require that
the widow receive one-third of her husband's estate.
18 Utah 98, 55 P. 84(1898)

Griffin v.

Gi:i!.0

The Court noted, however, that the amount
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-11awarded should be varied "in view of the particular facts and
circumstances."

This qualification seems to undo whatever value

the one-third/two-thirds

meas~re

has, unless it is merely to serve

as a starting point from which to make variations in light of all
the circumstances in the case.

In 1927 the Court emphasized in

discussing this standard that "no general rule can govern all cases,
but . . . the property disposition must be varied with the peculiar
circumstances of the case.''
(1927), modified (1928).

Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P. 292

The Court illustrated this point by referring

to various cases in which the property distribution was far from being
in accordance with the one-third/two-thirds standard and yet was
upheld on appeal.

In 1975 the Supreme Court approved a judgment that

apparently had been based on this standard, but its approval was not of
the standard itself but of the fact that in that case its application
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances.
532 P.2d 994(1975).

Cox v. Cox,

And in 1977 the Court stated that a wife in a

divorce case seeking one-third of her spouse's estate has a claim based
only on custom, not law; that there is no formula fixing an award of
one-third of the estate; and that the real focus is on the statutory
requirement that orders in relation to property distribution be
equitable.

Clearly, there is nothing in this analysis to encorage a

court to adhere strictly to the one-third/two-thirds measure.
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It is difficult in analyzing Utah Supreme Court opinions in
divorce cases to discover any pattern of approval or disapproval
concerning property distribution made by trial courts.

Indeed, the

Court itself was motivated at one time to declare that "since each
case goes off on its own facts, not much profit is gained by discussiL
them."

Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937)

On the

other hand, the Court in Watte v. Watts, 21 Utah 2d 137, 442 P.2d JO
( 1968) said that even though the facts of that case were not identical
to those in Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (!%!,
I

the situation was generally similar and the same principles and
authorities noted in that case were equally applicable to Watts.
Therefore, because the analysis of past case law may prove to be
persuasive here by analogy or distinction, several cases are briefly
analyzed below in chronological order.

Focus is on the property

distribution only.
--Stewart v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 P. 947 (1926)
H sued W for an assault.
estate, jointly owned.

H was awarded the house and real

W was awarded the household goods and $250 car

This distribution was found inequitable and unfair and was modified,
W to receive the household goods and one-half of the interest in t~
real estate with the house (no $250 cash).
marriage for both parties.

(2)

Analogous:

No children.

(3)

( 1)

Second

Married ten year!·
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-13(4) Ownership of property as tenants in common.
to

prop~rty

accumulation.

into the marriage.

(2)

Distinguishable:

(5) W contributed

(1) W brought property

H contributed little, but made house payments

from l1is small salary because convenient.

(3) H ten years older than

W, but W had rheumatism (affecting earning capacity of both).
--Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928 (1968)
W sued H.

W was awarded about half of $750,000 estate.

No abuse of discretion found.

Analogous:

(1) W assisted in supporting

family during early years of marriage; worked five years as nurse;
quit when first child was born and then assisted somewhat in H's medical
practice.

Distinguishable:

(1)

Married thirty-three years.

(2) In

addition to the $250 ,000 H accumulated by medical practice, $500,000
was accumulated by growth in value of stocks, a considerable portion of
which were purchased from or received as a gift from !l's father and
sister.

(3) Both had serious ailments; W totally disabled.

(4) Had

three children, now all adults.
--Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974)
W sued H.

W was awarded an equal division of proceeds on the

sale of their home, after liens and other judgments against the parties
were satisfied.

Abuse of discretion implied in Supreme Court's decision

to modify the judgment to reimburse W for the $3,400 down payment she
had made on the house, her claim being preferred over the other liens
and judgments.

Analogous:

(1)

Second marriage for both.

(2) Married
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nearly nine years.

(3) W worked most of those years.

Distinguishoc,.

(1) Had one five-year old child.

--Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (1977)
W sued H.
owned.

Each awarded a one-half interest in real estate th,,

No background discussion, but no abuse of discretion found

in dividing the proceeds equally.
Given the above law and case rulings, it can be reasonaly arg,,:
in the present case that the trial court abused its discretion

a~

the presently ordered property distribution is inequitable and violat"
the intent of statutory and case law.
The property acquired by the parties was all acquired during t'··
marriage, title was taken in their joint names, consideration was pai:
from funds acquired during the marriage from the equal effort and ti•
of the parties, the property was acquired as a mutually determined g~t'
and dream.

And the joint effort required to acquire and manage the

property, plus the mutual dis location of the parties from prior jobs,
home, and society, generally led to the disintegration of the marriar
The parties essentially entered the marriage on equal footing,
put forth equal effort into the

marraige and property accumulation,

and consequently, should leave the marraige with an approximate equal
distribution of property.
The present court order divides the property anywhere from onl1
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-1527% to 33% for the plaintiff, and from 67% to 73% to the defendant.
This is clearly inequitable and requires adjustment.
POINT I I.

ALIMONY SHOULD BE BASED UPON THE NEED OF THE RECIPIENT
AND THE ABILITY OF THE PARTIES TO EARN INCOME; AND FURTHER,
BASED UPON THE STANDARD OF LIVING TO WHICH THEY HAVE BECOME
ACCUSTOMED.

Again we are faced with the determination of what is reasonable
alimony.
1.

In making this determination the following facts are important:
The standard of living had by the parties during their

marriage was based upon disposable income, over and above that used to
acquire their property, of approximately $20,000 per year.
2.

The plaintiff is an able bodied woman, employed as a receptionist

with take-home pay of $540 per month, and has no other sources of income.
3.

The plaintiff's monthly budget requires expenditure of $763

to the fall of 1981 when it will increase to $1000 per month.
4.

The plaintiff is the sole provider for a teenage son.

5.

The plaintiff terminated all earned pension benefits in order

to acquire the property of the parties and move to Utah.
6.

The defendant is able bodied sufficient to do farm work full

time, and has job skills as a law enforcement officer and as an iron
worker.
7.

The defendant has income from pension benefits of $930 net each

month, with such sum increasing by cost of living adjustments.
Historically, the defendant has been employed and has had substantial
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-16earnings from his employment, averaging over $12,000 per year during
the marriage of the parties.

And in addition has been awarded substant.

income-producing farm property.
8.

There was no testimoney given regarding defendant's monthly

budget, however, we do have facts which show the home he 1 i ves in, his
farms, and machinery have been fully paid for.
9. The defendant has no dependants.
10. An award of temporary alimony of $300 per month was made bytl·
court.

And the defendant, consistently, without hardship, paid in

excess of $200 per month on such order.
Considering all of the above, it can be fairly concluded that th;
plaintiff has a need of alimony of no less than $200 per month, and th1
defendant has reasonable and adequate ability to pay the same.

Conseqcd

such an award would fall within the reasonable guide line of the
applicable statute, U .C.A. 1953 Section 30-3-5( 1)

And is also support•:

by case law, see English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
Consequently, the trial court's award of alimony in the sum of
$50 per month for 24 months is inadequate, placing the plaintiff in
necessitous circuD1Btances, while leaving the defendant with substantial:'
more income than is required to maintain his accustomed living standarl
This is not equitable and must now be remedied by ruling of this court.
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-17POINT III.

AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE BASED UPON REASONABLE
EFFORT EXPENDED AND A REASONABLE HOURLY CHARGE.

The awarding of attorney fees in divorce actions is statutorily
founded in Section 30-3-3, U.C.A. 1953.

And has been implimented

and adopted by the courts, which set as guidelines:
1.
2.

Necessity of party requesting.
Granting and amount is within trial court's sound
discretion.

See Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
The plaintiff had need for attorney fees.

Her income of $540 per

month plus the court ordered alimony of $50 per month, do not cover
her undisputed expenses which are in excess of $760 per month.
The defendant has ability to pay.

With pension income in excess

of $900 per month, plus earnings from the farm and other employment
to which he can devote substantial time.
There was no dispute and the court found that considering the time
reasonably devoted to his client's cause and a reasonable hourly charge,
plaintiff had incurred attorney fees in the sum of $1540.00.
The effort of counsel greatly assisted the court, and the Court
so commented:
"You did a good job, incidentally. I appreciate that very
much. And as a matter of fact, without those Schedules and
without your submission on the farm property and whatever,
I would not have been able to have understood what the testimony
was all about." T. 93.
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